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ABSTRACT
The era of traditional cable Television (TV) is swiftly coming to an
end. People today subscribe to a multitude of streaming services.
Smart TVs have enabled a new generation of entertainment, not
only limited to constant on-demand streaming as they now offer
other features such as web browsing, communication, gaming etc.
These functions have recently been embedded into a small IoT
device that can connect to any TV with High Definition Multime-
dia Interface (HDMI) input known as Google Chromecast TV. Its
wide adoption makes it a treasure trove for potential digital evi-
dence. Our work is the primary source on forensically interrogating
Chromecast TV devices. We found that the device is always un-
locked, allowing extraction of application data through the backup
feature of Android Debug Bridge (ADB) without device root access.
We take advantage of this minimal access and demonstrate how a
series of artifacts can stitch together a detailed timeline, and we au-
tomate the process by constructing Forensicast – a Chromecast TV
forensic acquisition and timelining tool. Our work targeted (n=112)
of the most popular Android TV applications including 69% (77/112)
third party applications and 31% (35/112) system applications. 65%
(50/77) third party applications allowed backup, and of those 90%
(45/50) contained time-based identifiers, 40% (20/50) invoked some
form of logs/activity monitoring, 50% (25/50) yielded some sort of
token/cookie, 8% (4/50) resulted in a device ID, 26% (13/50) pro-
duced a user ID, and 24% (12/50) created other information. 26%
(9/35) system applications provided meaningful artifacts, 78% (7/9)
provided time based identifiers, 22% (2/9) involved some form of
logs/activity monitoring, 22% (2/9) yielded some form of token/-
cookie data, 22% (2/9) resulted in a device ID, 44% (4/9) provided a
user ID, and 33% (3/9) created other information. Our findings also
illustrated common artifacts found in applications that are related
to developer and advertising utilities, mainly WebView, Firebase,
and Facebook Analytics. Future work and open research problems
are shared.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Google Chromecast was first released in 2013 and quickly
caught on as a means to easily share content from a smartphone,
tablet, or other device to a Television (TV) screen. As of October
2017, over 55 million Chromecasts and Chromecast-enabled devices
have been sold [13].
While older Chromecast devices ran Google’s own Google TV,
in September of 2020 the Android-based Google Chromecast with
Google TV
1
was released, offering a stand alone streaming device
with a remote, similar to offerings like the Amazon Fire TV and
Roku TV line of products. The Chromecast TV is a device that was
designed to accommodate all streaming services, and applications,
under one interface. It also provides the ability for users to download
and install different Chromecast TV applications (entertainment,
browsing, communication etc.).
Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as the Chromecast TV
offer great value due to their frequency of use and ability to provide
evidence on what a user may have been doing at a given time. There
is already precedence for the use of digital evidence extracted from
IoT devices in cases, such as evidence obtained from an Amazon
Alexa in a homicide investigation in 2017 [6].
While past work focused on the extraction of digital evidence
from smart TVs and streaming devices, no work has explored a
non-intrusive extraction and analysis of digital evidence from the
Chromecast TV. We present the primary work on the forensic
analysis of a Chromecast TV. Our contributions are as follows:
• We test and share a non-intrusive logical acquisition ap-
proach for a Chromecast TV without the need for root ac-
cess, nor any authentication between Chromecast TV and
the forensic workstation used to acquire it.
• We share our findings from the analysis of a logical extrac-
tion of 112 Chromecast TV applications.
• We provide investigators with a suggested investigative ap-
proach for logically analyzing a Chromecast TV.
• We construct Forensicast, a tool that parses data from arti-
facts of forensic relevance and presents a timeline of user
activity in a readable manner.
1
Henceforth referred to as the Chromecast TV
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• We share common artifacts along with retrieval methods
with the Digital Forensics community through the Artifact
Genome Project (AGP) [10].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
share our methodology. We follow that up with our results in Sec-
tion 3. We then present Forensicast in Section 4 and a suggested
investigator workflow in Section 5. We then discuss our work in
Section 6, and present our future work in Section 7. We end our
paper with the related work in Section 8. Note that Appendix A
lists all applications and their respective version numbers used in
this research and Appendix B lists the artifacts recovered.
2 METHODOLOGY
Our work embodied the following step-wise procedure for each
application tested:
• Experimental Setup: The Chromecast TV was set up and
prepared for developer debugging and application backup
extraction (See Section 2.1)
• Scenario Creation: Artifacts were manually created on the
device by simulating normal usage (See Section 2.2)
• Artifact Extraction & Analysis: Artifacts were extracted
using the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) and then manually
analysed (See Section 2.3)
2.1 Experimental Setup
We employed an experimental setup with the Chromecast TV con-
nected to a monitor with the built in High Definition Multimedia
Interface (HDMI) connector on the Chromecast TV to view the dis-
play output. The Chromecast TV was also physically connected to
a forensic workstation for power using a Universal Serial Bus (USB)
Type C (USB-C) cable. The same power cable was employed in the
acquisition of data from the device using ADB. Due to the storage
limitations of the Chromecast TV, applications were loaded onto
the device in batches of 30. User actions were simulated via the
Chromecast TV remote, data was acquired, and then applications
were deleted to free up space for other applications. This process
was repeated until we tested 112 applications. In order to download
applications, the Chromecast TV was connected to a WiFi network.
2.2 Scenario Creation
Before recovering any artifacts normal usage had to be simulated.
This was accomplished by using each application for at least five
minutes. A full list and count of the applications installed can be
found in A. Author accounts were used to log into applications that
required a paid subscription. Applications that used accounts but
prevented usage without payment were still used as user credentials
could be captured. A live feed from an Oculus Quest 2 Virtual
Reality (VR) headset as well as a YouTube video from an iPhone
were streamed (casted) to the device to determine if these casting
actions produced any unique artifacts.
2.3 Artifact Extraction & Analysis
To logically acquire the Chromecast TV device, a few settings must
first be changed on the Chromecast itself. This would be indicative
of an investigator having physical access to the device. First, de-
veloper mode must be activated (Figure 1). USB debugging is then
allowed in the developer mode menu (Figure 2 and Figure 3).
Figure 1: Activating Developer Mode on the Chromecast TV
Figure 2: Allowing Debugging Permissions
Figure 3: Allowing USB Debugging on the Chromecast TV
The Chromecast was connected to a computer and the ADB com-
mand adb devices was ran to find the list of devices connected
to the computer, which returned the Chromecast.
2
The command
adb shell pm list packages was run to list the packages in-
stalled on the device. After selecting a target application (in this case
YouTube) the command adb backup -f Backup.ab com.package.name
was executed to backup the application data. This was run twice,
once before accessing the application and once after. After pulling
the backup from the Chromecast TV, a tool called Android Backup
Toolkit
3
was utilized to extract the contents of the backup file. Diff-
based forensics as well as manual exploration were used against
the two recovered files to determine what artifacts may have been
created.
4
The accounts were then deleted from the device in order
2





Android application PacKage (APK) files can be installed directly on an Android
phone and run correctly. It is not user-friendly or responsive to touch gestures aside
from tapping the screen and is locked to a 16 by 9 aspect ratio, however, it can run
just as any other application further proving the similarities in Android Mobile and
Android TV
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to explore if artifacts could still be recovered. The methodology is
summarized in the following steps, and is demonstrated in Figure
4:
(1) Download desired application
(2) Backup entire device with ADB before using service
(3) Login, use application
(4) Backup again
(5) Convert ADB backups to readable files
(6) Use diff to find changed data and extract artifacts
(a) Compare the two pulled directories for changes
(b) Collate different files
(7) Examine collated files
(a) Explore Structured Query Language (SQL)ite files
(b) Explore eXtensible Markup Language (XML) files
Figure 4: Artifact Acquisition Flowchart
This resulted in several interesting files, and allowed for the
collection of artifacts from the Chromecast TV. A full list of forensic
artifacts collected from third-party applications can be found in
B and a full list of artifacts collected from system applications is
shared in C. Applications that did not produce useful artifacts (or
did not produce any artifacts at all, as detailed in Section 6) are
not listed. An abbreviated list of system application artifacts can be
found in Table 1.
3 RESULTS
Of the 112 applications used in our work, 69% (77/112) were third
party applications and 31% (35/112) were system applications. 35%
(27/77) third party applications did not allow backup, and the reason-
ing for this is explained in Section 6. While we were able to backup
35 total system applications only the 9 applications listed (26%)
provided meaningful results. There are more system applications
on the device, however, we will only focus on system applications
which can provide backups. Of the 9 system applications, a brief
overview of the artifacts they provide is located in Table 1. Of the 50
third party applications that allow backups, 90% (45/50) contained
time-based identifiers, 40% (20/50) invoked some form of logs/ac-
tivity monitoring, 50% (25/50) yielded some sort of token/cookie,
8% (4/50) resulted in a device ID, 26% (13/50) produced a user ID,
and 24% (12/50) created other information. The overall results are
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Figure 5: Application Artifact Results (n=112)
3.1 Common Artifacts
Some artifacts are very similar or identical across multiple applica-
tions. If the developers are employing Facebook Analytics, Google
Firebase, or Android Webview they will generally follow the same
file structure. In total 8% (9/112) of applications use Facebook ana-
lytics, 15% (17/112) of applications use Firebase, and 28% (32/112)
of applications utilize Android WebView.
• Facebook Analytics: Many of the most popular applica-
tions on the Google TV store utilize some form of advertise-
ment sharing or analytical data gathering. Facebook Analyt-
ics saves numerous files to the application folder. These can
be found in the applications sp folder normally following
the naming scheme facebook.IMPLEMENTATION.xml. These
files do not store any Personal Identifiable Information, how-
ever, they provide timestamps which can be used to piece
together user activity. The times are stored in UNIX time, as
are all other timestamps other than custom logging applica-
tions.
• Firebase: Google Firebase, often used in correlation with
Google Analytics and AdMob, is an application development
tool which can handle most of the application data in the
cloud. This means that any of the applications that employ
Firebase have the same logging implementation. Firebase
creates a number of logs that data can be extracted from. Fire-
base files can be found in the applications sp folder as well
as the /f/.com.google.firebase.crashlytics folder if
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Table 1: Android System Artifacts
Application Time Based Identifier Logs/Activity Token/Cookie Device ID UserID Other
Android System WebView ✓
Remote Control Logging ✓
Android Play Games ✓ ✓
Google app for Android TV ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Android TV Ambient Mode ✓
Chromecast built-in ✓ ✓ ✓
Android Intelligence Settings ✓
Captive Portal Login ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Android Providers ✓
Firebase is utilizing Crashlytics. Every application which uti-
lizes Firebase creates a /sp/FirebaseAppHeartBeat.xml
file which houses a global and installation id, which are gen-
erated from the UNIX time in which Firebase was first run
for that application. This is a signal that the application was
installed and run for the first time at that timestamp. Firebase
may create optional Google Analytics XML files in the /sp/
directory. Firebase also creates a /f/PersistedInstallation.
UNIQUEID.json file which refreshes a token while updating
a timestamp to keep track of a user. Applications which uti-
lize Firebase generate a plethora of useful artifacts for user
tracking
• WebView: Android System WebView is an Android Com-
ponent to implement content-invoking within applications.
WebView may be utilized when presenting browser data or
to call web-pages in the back-end for application use. Web-
View by default stores all of the history in log files as well as
cookies. Cookie data as well as some occasional log files (de-
pendant on the application) are stored in /r/app_webview.
Local and Session storage database logs are often stored in
this folder giving a full account of everything the user has
done recently. WebView may create preference files in the
applications sp folder. Applications which utilize WebView
provide the richest artifacts.
3.2 Casting
After streaming data to the device using both an iPhone and an
Oculus Quest 2 it became apparent that data can be found in the
Android Media Shell which defines exactly which user was on the
device, the associated display name of that user, which website they
were casting (if applicable), and which type of device they were us-
ing. This is stored in com.google.android.apps.mediashell/r/
app_cast_shell/Local Storage/leveldb/000003.log. Although
stored in a log file, when restarting the device the system will au-
tomatically recover and keep the log intact. This means that even
after removing power from the device the log may be recoverable.
3.3 Browsers
While the data collection for most of the applications followed
the same methodology, browser data is likely to hold the most
sensitive information. All of the popular browsers that were tested
(TVWeb, Jiopages, Downloader) utilize WebView. Each contains
a full log of every site visited as well as every stored cookie. The
Local, and Session, storage folders house even more logs which go
in greater depth. The history may be cleared from these applications
in settings, however, this does not actually remove the history from
logs but instead removes the Uniform Resource Locator (URL)s
from the front-end only and ignores WebView. This means that
even if the user clears their history, as long as they do not uninstall
the application, all of their activity may still be retrieved.
4 FORENSICAST
We constructed Forensicast – a tool used to acquire, discover, and
present artifacts from the Chromecast TV. Aswell as including some
basic ADB management tools, Forensicast can dynamically create a
log-style timeline of actions by piecing together artifacts from vari-
ous applications. Forensicast can be downloaded from the following
GitHub repository: https://github.com/unhcfreg/ForensiCast.
Algorithm 1 Common Artifact Discovery
1: procedure findART(bPaths,bNames,WebView, Face-
book,Firebase)
2: 𝑊𝑒𝑏𝑉𝑖𝑒𝑤 ←𝑊𝑒𝑏𝑉𝑖𝑒𝑤 ⊲ Has WebView
3: 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 ← 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 ⊲ Has Facebook
4: 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 ← 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 ⊲ Has Firebase
5: 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠 ← 𝑏𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠 ⊲ List of Applicaton Paths
6: 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠 ← 𝑏𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠 ⊲ List of Applicaton Names
7: 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 ← [] ⊲ Blank List for Results for
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠, 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 do
8:
end
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ ← 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠 ⊲ Current File Path
9: 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒 ← 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠 ⊲ Current File Name
10: 𝑊𝑒𝑏 ←𝑊𝑒𝑏𝑉𝑖𝑒𝑤 ⊲ Has WebView
11: 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 ← 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 ⊲ Has WebView




14: break if 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 ≠ 0 then
15:
end
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠+ = 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ/𝑠𝑝/𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘.∗




18: 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠+ = 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ/𝑓 /𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑∗




Algorithm 1 shows our constructed approach for Forensicast. Ap-
plications which utilize the common packages WebView, Firebase,
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and Facebook Software Development Kit (SDK) share common ar-
tifacts which can be recovered using the given algorithm. For N
applications currently being researched, we will extract relevant
artifacts.
The procedure utilizes bPaths, the path to the applications ex-
tracted backup folder, and bNames, the name of each application.
WebView, Firebase, and Facebook variables are used to indicate
whether the application is utilizing each package or not. This will
have to be known ahead of time by looking briefly at the applica-
tions extracted backup directory.
In Algorithm 1, lines 2-7 set up our variables for later use. The
bulk of the algorithm begins on line 8 with the start of a for loop
which is run through for all N packages.
If an application is utilizing the selected package, then the al-
gorithm will direct the user to artifacts produced by the package.
If WebView is set to 1/true then the algorithm will collect the re-
quired files on lines 14-17. For WebView this is an entire folder as
the contents of this folder may vary greatly for each application.
Lines 18-21 execute the extraction of Facebook-related artifacts.
If Facebook packages are used and Facebook is set to true then files
in the /sp/ directory which start with the phrase "facebook" will
be returned.
If Firebase is set to true then the algorithm returns the com.google
.firebase.crashlytics folder on lines 22-27. Firebase artifacts
also include files in the /sp/ directory which contain the phrase
"Firebase" at the beginning.
4.2 Usage
The options in the menu shown in Figure 6 perform the following
actions:
(1) Create Full Timeline - Create a big timeline using any and
all data gathered (Listing 1)
(2) Create Partial Timeline - Create a timeline based on a given
start/end time
(3) Dump All Recoverable Data - Pull every file in the file system
that ADB has permissions for
(4) Backup App - Backup all packages
(5) Backup Package - Given Package name, backup specific pack-
age
(6) List All Installed Packages
(7) Install APK - Push APK to device for installation
4.3 Timelines
Using artifacts extracted in Section 2, a timeline of user activity can
be created. Timelining is imperative in digital forensics as it helps
tell the story of what happened [15]. This functionality was built
into Forensicast, and an example timeline is shown in Listing 1.
1
2 com.google.android.youtube.tv ==> Youtube 2020 -02 -03
10:04:34+00:00 -> 2020 -02 -03 10:37:56+00:00
3 {
4 2020 -02 -03 10:04:34+00:00 == Application Opened
5 2020 -02 -03 10:05:17+00:00 == User 'nnoots93@gmail.com ' (
Google ID BcSy54k8BMOgV9FAntBCRA) Logged In
6 2020 -02 -03 10:37:56+00:00 == Application Closed
7 }
8
Figure 6: Forensicast Tool Menu
9
10 com.radioline.android.radioline ==> Radioline 2020 -02 -03
10:42:29+00:00 -> 2020 -02 -03 14:21:31+00:00
11 {
12 2020 -02 -03 10:42:29+00:00 == Application Opened , First
Installation
13 Favorites DB == Last Listened To 'Cherie Romantic '
Channel




18 jp.co.rarity.tvweb ==> TVWeb 2020 -02 -04 11:21:44+00:00 ->
2020 -02 -04 11:34:03+00:00
19 {
20 2020 -02 -04 11:21:44+00:00 == Application Opened
21 2020 -02 -04 11:22:01+00:00 == https ://www.google.com/
22 2020 -02 -04 11:22:10+00:00 == Sign in - Google Accounts
https :// accounts.google.com/ServiceLogin?hl
23 2020 -02 -04 11:23:07+00:00 == Sign in - Google Accounts
24 2020 -02 -04 11:23:50+00:00 == Noot Noot - Google Search
25 2020 -02 -04 11:34:47+00:00 == Application Closed
26 }
Listing 1: Example Timeline Output
The example timeline in Listing 1 shows a user opening the
YouTube package (line 2) at 10:04 AM (line 4) and logging in with
the account "nnoots93@gmail.com" at 10:05 AM on March 2nd
2021 (line 5). The user then closes the application at 10:37 AM
(line 6). Forensicast will attempt to resolve the application name
(YouTube) from the given package name (com.android.youtube.tv),
however, if it cannot be found Unknown Application will be listed
instead. The same formula is applied to other applications, as first
the package name is stated then artifact information is stated.
5 RECOMMENDED INVESTIGATOR
WORKFLOW
The workflow for an investigator is similar to the experimental
workflow used in this paper (detailed in Sections 2.1 and 2.3) and
includes the Forensicast tool (Section 4).
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(1) Connect Chromecast TV to a monitor for visual data and
a forensic workstation with ADB installed using a USB-C
cable to pull backups.
5
(2) Activate Developer mode on the Chromecast TV by interact-
ing with the Android TV OS Build info box in the About
section of the Settings menu ten times (Shown in Figure
1).
(3) In the Developer section of the Settings menu allow USB
Debugging (Shown in Figure 3).
(4) Run the command adb devices on the connected laptop
and select Allow on the Chromecast TV to allow the backing
up of data (Shown in Figure 2).
(5) Run the command adb shell pm list packages to get a
list of all installed applications.
(6) Run the command adb shell pm path <package name> to
get the path of the desired package.
(7) Run the command adb pull <path to package> to pull
the APK to the investigating computer.
(8) Extract SQLite database, XML, and log files.
(9) Determine if these files contain valid artifacts to reconstruct
any event history
(10) Use the information gained to create a timeline.
Forensicast aims at automating steps 4-10 to speed up the inves-
tigative process and automate the artifact extraction and timeline
creation.
5.1 Example Scenario
Forensicast and the forensic analysis of a Chromecast TV could
be used to determine the time, location, viewer, and content in a
forensic investigation, which in turn provide:
• Evidence to prove or disprove an alibi.
• Viewing history which provides evidence a suspect viewed
media that encouraged them to commit a crime.
• Location history to show where a suspect actually was.
• Account history to show who was watching or that account
information had been shared between the owner of the
Chromecast TV and an account holder.
We set up a fictitious scenario with a student that was accused
of murdering a person in New York. After creating the user based
scenario, our tool was run and produced the following artifacts:
• Emails - nnoots93@gmail.com
• Google Search - how to hide a body
• YouTube - How To Hide A Body - Apr 25 2021 20:55:04 GMT
• Google Search - food near Bethpage New York
• Notes - "1. Go to NY, 2. Kill Jimmy"
6 DISCUSSION
With Android TV, especially the Google TV version, being a newer
and less common operating system there is still much to be asked
for in terms of security. This is partially due to third party app
developers not fully understanding what plugins do in the back-end
or simply not caring as much and partially due to the simplification
and user intuitiveness features of the Google TV operating system
5
In the absence of the remote for the Chromecast TV, a USB gamepad or keyboard can
be plugged in using a USB-C hub in order to give input to the device.
coming at the cost of security. While this can be seen as bad for the
general population this is a great thing for forensic researchers.
Android TV is still somewhat of an untapped field and can offer
much more potential than just what has been outlined in this paper.
The work we performed was only a simple dive into backup data.
While producing valid results, this is only the beginning and there
is still much to be discovered.
35% (27/77) of third party applications tested did not provide
backups. Adding the line android_allowBackup="false" to the
Android Manifest.XML file in the application will disallow users
from making a backup of the app without root permissions. This is
beneficial for app developers who wish to hide sensitive data from
the methods used in this paper, however, it presents a challenge to
investigators as the device in question must be rooted in order to
access the information stored in those applications.
It is also quite apparent that most of the artifacts are not created
directly by the application themselves but by the implementation
of plugins and system calls. A developer could, if so inclined, hide
these calls or get rid of them all together.
As there were no functioning methods to gain root access to the
Chromecast TV at the time of writing (August 25, 2021) there is
no way to access the /data/ folder directly. This means that an
investigator cannot gather many important files from the system
and various applications.
The data stored on a Chromecast TV contains more than just
usage time (when a user was watching), as it holds account in-
formation (who was watching/listening), history (what they were
watching/listening to), tokens/cookies (which can be used to iden-
tify them elsewhere), and in some circumstances location infor-
mation (where they were). As the Chromecast TV is portable and
consumes little electricity, it may be used by travelers to consume
media on a hotel TV or in a vehicle with media capability, such as
an Recreational Vehicle (RV) or some models of cars.
There can only be one user account associatedwith a Chromecast
TV, and there are no users, but individual applications can have
separate user profiles (E.g., Netflix). There is also no password
needed to authenticate to the device, however it is necessary to
provide user input.
7 FUTUREWORK
In our work we focused on data that could be easily accessible
that was not obscured or encrypted. Since encoded or encrypted
artifacts show up often, future work may want to explore methods
of decrypting or deobfuscating such data.
Other versions of Android TV such as the official copy and
those offered by Samsung have parental locks and other restriction
options to lock the device behind a password. Future work should
explore how parental restrictions may prevent a backup and how
to negate or bypass these restrictions.
As the device was new during our work, there were no function-
ing rooting methods that were found. This rendered some applica-
tions and artifacts to be inaccessible as detailed in Section 6. With
rooting, an investigator could explore more than just the backup
directory, and may uncover deleted data since a physical image
maybe acquired.
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Recovering artifacts through hardware hacking and debugging
could also be a worthy future work endeavour. Lastly, our work
did not explore the network traffic of the Chromecast TV. While
it appears to be similar to an Android device in terms of netcode,
there may be artifacts unique to this device that future research
may uncover.
8 RELATEDWORK
Little work has explored the area of smart TV forensics. At the time
of writing, prior research did not explore a non-intrusive acquisition
and analysis method of the Chromecast TV. In this section, we cover
past efforts related to our work in the areas of smart TV exploits
and forensics, and non-intrusive forensic acquisition and analysis.
8.1 Chromecast Exploits
ghostlulz [sic.] [9] detailed how to replicate the infamous Chrome-
cast hack that occurred in early January of 2019. The attack was
performed by sending a POST request to a Chromecast with a
YouTube URL which will cause the Chromecast to automatically
play that video.
Marck [14] discussed some of the vulnerabilities present in an
off the shelf Android TV box from 2017. This box was different
from the Chromecast TV in that it was rooted in its default state.
The researchers installed Busybox (a set of custom binaries for
UNIX devices) and then proceeded to install various malware with
the intent to simulate an attack on a home network. They were
successful in attacking several devices on the network, as well as
capturing displayed information on the device. They further dis-
cussed potential mitigation techniques to prevent the exploitation
of the device.
8.2 Smart TV Forensics
Morrison et al. [17] described attempts to acquire forensic images
of various devices, including an original Chromecast, a Measy A2W
Miracast, and an Amazon Fire TV Stick. The researchers concluded
that there was little possibility to pull data from the Chromecast, a
slim possibility to acquire data from the Miracast. The researchers
developed a framework to acquire forensic images from an Amazon
Fire TV Stick. Their method involved rooting the Fire TV Stick and
editing the file permissions to access the user data on the device.
This is similar to the goal of this paper, however, at the time of
writing (August 25, 2021) there were no functioning root methods
that could be found for the Chromecast TV.
Tekeoglu and Tosun [18] detailed their attempts to extract net-
work and other vulnerability information from a 2013model Chrome-
cast without physical exploitation. The research concluded that the
older version of a Chromecast does not encrypt control packets and
leaks network data.
Boztas et al. [5] researched the acquisition of forensic artifacts
from a Samsung SmartTV. Their research employed several methods
to directly read the data from the flash memory chip located on
the device. Their first attempt was to wire the chip to an Secure
Digital (SD) card reader connected to a write blocker, however, this
did not work. The researchers then de-soldered the memory chip
and used a Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) Memory Toolkit
II (MTK II) (A combination of hardware and software that is able
to directly read memory chips
6
) to access the data. Understanding
that this is not feasible for many investigators, they also presented
a software method that involved rooting the smart TV to access the
entire file system. This allowed the researchers to collect artifacts
which detailed most, if not all, of the activity on the device.
Falayeh [7] explored common usage of smart TVs, how they can
be compromised, and an overview of some data recovery methods.
The researchers found that there are many issues facing smart TV
forensics, mainly the lack of standardization of tools, devices, and
approaches.
Hadgkiss et al. [11] listed methods of collecting artifacts from
an Amazon Fire TV Stick. Initially, software methods were used in
an attempt to image the device, however, without root access this
did not work so hardware methods similar to what was outlined in
[5] were used.
8.3 Non-intrusive Acquisition & Analysis
Feng et al. [8] described a method to subvert the issues of having a
device that cannot be rooted. In their work they employ a manu-
facturer’s system level data transfer solution to transfer data to a
surrogate rooted device. The surrogate device can then be attached
to a computer for forensic acquisition.
Bader and Baggili [4] detailed the primary account for the logical
acquisition of artifacts from an iPhone 3GS using the Apple iTunes
Utility. This approach was also generalized in [12], and prior work
has also explored the difference between manually examining the
backup, versus using an automated tool [3]. Building on the iOS
past work, researchers then created an open source source tool,
Logical iOS Forensic Examiner (LiFE) for automatically analyzing
the backup files of an iOS device [1].
Marzougy et al. [16] explored the logical acquisition of forensic
artifacts from a Blackberry PlayBook backup file. Their approach
detailed that the backup file was essentially a zip file, and a number
of forensically relevant artifacts were extractable.
Lastly, Mutawa et al. [2] explored the analysis of social network-
ing applications on iPhones, Blackberry phones, and an Android
phone. The researchers acquired a forensic image of each of these
devices and were able to extract social networking artifacts from
the Android phone and the iPhones, but were unsuccessful with
the Blackberry devices. Mutawa et al. noted that there were no
unified backup solutions at that time for Android phones, forcing
the researchers to use a third party application to backup Android
devices.
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A LIST OF APPLICATIONS
This section contains a list of all the applications used in this paper as well as their version numbers when applicable.




















































ABC News Live (v10.11.1.102)








The Washington Post (4.13.1)
USA Today (v1.4.5)
Orbia (v1.084)
Red Ball 4 (v1.4.21)
Pacman 256 (v2.0.2)
Zen Pinball (v1.47)
Fast Like a Fox (v1.4.6)
Badland (v3.2.0.45)










android.chromecast android.bluetooth.chromecast android.bluetoothmidiservice android.captiveportallogin
cts.ctsshim priv.ctsshim dreams.basic android.externalstorage
android.htmlviewer android.managedprovisioning android.modulemetadata android.pacprocessor
android.printspooler providers.tv android.proxyhandler settings.intelligence
settings.intelligence settings.chromecast android.wallpaperbackup Chromecast Built In (v1.50.228700)
Android TV Ambient Mode (v1.0.331776182) tv.netoscope android.chromecastsetupcustomization ext.services
android.katniss Google App for Andoid TV (vVaries with device) android.onetimeinitializer overlay.googlewebview
Google Play Games (vVaries with device) sss.authbridge tv.bugreportsender tv.frameworkpackagestubs
remotecontrol.logging service.chromecast Android System WebView (v88.0.4324.181)
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B LIST OF APPPLICATION ARTIFACTS





























...crashlytics-core/ folder ✓ ✓
...tv.db ✓
TVWeb








WebView ✓ ✓ ✓
...prefs.xml ✓
...admob.xml ✓
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WebView ✓ ✓ ✓
Fite






























Firebase w/ AdMob ✓
Facebook ✓
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C LIST OF SYSTEM ARTIFACTS
This section contains a table detailing the types of artifacts collected from the Android system.






















































WebView ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Android Providers ...preferences.xml ✓
